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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is something fundamentally American about the class action. 
One can almost hear those commercials as they drift from our radios and 
televisions: “If you or a loved has been harmed by . . . you may be entitled 
to compensation . . . .” The class action allows the masses to have 
accountability for multi-jurisdictional wrongs. It allows redress to be 
swift, efficient, and applicable to all those harmed, no matter how far 
away. Although the class action has been central to some of the largest 
societal changes experienced in the United States, the tool has faced 
constant challenges as it enters its 52nd year of modern use.1 While the 
class action has faced continued scrutiny, one recent challenge stands out 
among the rest. That challenge comes in the form of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California2, 
which suggests that money damages class actions may not proceed, absent 
the forum’s specific personal jurisdiction over defendant with respect to 
the claim of each absent class member. Bristol-Myers Squibb suggests that 
unless the claim by each absent class member arose from defendant’s 
conduct in the forum, the forum lacks personal jurisdiction to adjudicate 
1. “Modern” in this case is referring to the modern promulgation of Rule 23 after the 1966 
Revision. See infra Part I.A.1.  
2. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
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that class member’s claims against the defendant.3 That’s strong dicta, and 
if courts interpret the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision to apply to absent 
class members, it could threaten the nationwide money damages class 
action as we have come to know it. 
The Bristol-Myers Squibb Court held that the California state courts 
lacked jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiffs’ claims because the claims 
of the non-resident plaintiffs did not arise from, or relate to, Bristol Myers 
Squibb’s contacts with the state of California.4 However, the Bristol-
Myers Squibb case was not a class action. Instead, it arose from the joinder 
under Rule 20(a) of over 600 persons as named plaintiffs in the action.5 
This joinder formed what is known as a “mass action,” where a large 
group of plaintiffs aggregate through traditional joinder rules and not 
through the class action rules. Class actions were not at issue in the 
Bristol-Myers Squibb case. Thus, the Supreme Court left unanswered 
whether this limited personal jurisdiction analysis would apply to cases 
filed in federal court.6 In her lone dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted that 
the Court’s opinion failed to address whether the ruling would be applied 
to class actions where “a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to 
represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured 
there.”7 
The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb has 
drastically altered the litigation playing field. Following the 8–1 decision 
disavowing California’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over drug 
manufacturer Bristol Myers Squibb, waves of motions to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction have begun to overwhelm plaintiffs in mass tort 
actions.8 Personal jurisdiction arguments in “mass” as opposed to “class” 
actions are much more straightforward. A mass action is a large group of 
aggregated plaintiffs who are all named parties to the action. On the other 
hand, a class action is a procedural tool which allows a few representatives 
to initiate a suit on behalf of absent class members, and comes with its 
own set of rules and procedure under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.9 
While both plaintiffs and defendants in mass actions have shifted their 
focus to meet the jurisdictional standards outlined by the Supreme Court, 
3. Id. at 1783. 
4. Id. at 1779–81.
5. Id. at 1778.
6. Id. at 1784.
7. Id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8. Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Litigation Trends 2018, at 22 (2018),
https://www.weil.com/~/media/publications/alerts/2018/litigation_trends_2018_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UN2X-PRXC]. 
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
3
McLeod: Worrisome Application to Class Actions
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
724 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:721 
one major question has been left open: whether the ruling applies to class 
actions. 
Determining the answer to this question poses an immense challenge. 
The answer could come in one of three varieties, each of which has been 
embraced by the district courts that have dealt with the issue.10 
Specifically, courts are divided on how to apply the opinion to the parties 
representing the class and the absent class members (the parties who are 
not present in the case, yet who would be bound by the judgement). First, 
some courts have held that the personal jurisdiction analysis of Bristol-
Myers Squibb is not applicable to either named class representatives or 
absent class members.11 Second, some district courts have held that the 
Bristol-Myers Squibb personal jurisdiction analysis applies to named 
representatives, who are in much the same position as mass action 
plaintiffs, but not absent class members.12 Finally, a small group of courts, 
mostly originating from the Northern District of Illinois, have concluded 
that the limiting personal jurisdiction analysis of Bristol-Myers Squibb 
applies to both named representatives and absent class members—
perhaps warranting another sighting of the death of the class action, or at 
least the nationwide money damages class action.13 With its far-reaching 
implications, the Seventh and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have been 
the first to offer limited guidance.14 
10. Christopher Murphy & Elizabeth Rowe, Federal Courts Diverge on Bristol-Myers and
Class Actions, LAW 360 (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1086278/federal-courts-
diverge-on-bristol-myers-and-class-actions [https://perma.cc/AS7E-B6ZH]. 
11. See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL
4224723 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2017); In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litig., No. 
09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017); Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-
01279, 2018 WL 6460451 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); Sloan v. General Motors, LLC, 287 F. Supp. 
3d. 840 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Ochoa v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 5:17-cv-02019, 2018 WL 4998293 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018); Tickling Keys, Inc. v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d. 
1342, (M.D. Fla. 2018); Becker v. HBN Media, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2018).  
12. See Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 741 (N.D. Ill. 2018) [hereafter Al Haj I]; Molock 
v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D.D.C. 2018); Lee v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co.,
No. 18-21876, 2018 WL 5633995, (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018).  
13. See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018);
Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2017); In re Dental Supplies Antitrust 
Lit., No. 16 Civ. 696, 2017 WL 4217115 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017); Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services 
v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840 (N.D. Ill. 2018); DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17
C 6125, 2018 WL 461228 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018); McDonnell v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC, No. 
16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 
1948, 2018 WL 2238191 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2018); Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins., No. CV-
17-00165, 2017 WL 4357916 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017). 
14. See Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 2018); Molock v. Whole Foods 
Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
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I conclude that the Bristol-Myers Squibb ruling should not be applied 
to non-resident class members in class actions. In this Note, I will 
demonstrate that there is no reason to shoehorn the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
opinion to apply in class action litigation because the major concerns cited 
by courts applying the opinion to absent class members’ claims are either 
insignificant or adequately handled by other procedural tools. Those 
concerns include: (1) a concern that nationwide class actions pose 
federalism concerns; (2) challenging Rule 23 under the Rules Enabling 
Act; and (3) forum shopping concerns. 
In Part II, I will provide a brief history of the class action in American 
practice by showing its growth as a procedural tool and the recent 
restrictions on its use. This is vital to understanding the scrutiny class 
actions face in current practice. Further, I will provide the framework of 
important decisions regarding personal jurisdiction issued by the Supreme 
Court. Both are crucial to understanding the rationale of the Bristol-Myers 
Squibb opinion and its potential application to class actions. 
In Part III, I will analyze the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion and show 
the reasoning behind the Court’s holding. I will detail both the majority 
Court and Justice Sotomayor’s analysis of California’s exercise of 
specific jurisdiction and how this ruling implicates an application to class 
actions. I will further demonstrate the growing district court divide in 
resolving this question by detailing the three categories of decisions that 
have arisen in applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions. 
Finally, in Part IV I will argue why the three major concerns 
presented by courts applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to absent class 
members are unwarranted. First, federalism concerns are not present in 
federal class actions, as there are procedural safeguards ensuring a single 
nationwide or multistate class does not violate due process. Second, 
failing to apply a personal jurisdiction analysis to absent class members 
does not modify rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act, as the 
Supreme Court affirmed use of Rule 23 in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Association. Finally, forum shopping concerns have little merit, as class 
members cannot procedurally take advantage of one forum’s substantive 
law to their claim, and the Class Action Fairness Act allows immediate 
removal to federal forums. 
Ultimately, I conclude in Part V that because these concerns are not 
present or pose an insignificant risk in class actions, courts should not 
apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to dismiss the claims of absent class 
members. 
5
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II. THE RECEDING POWER OF CLASS ACTIONS AND THE RESTRICTION
TO SPECIFIC JURISDICTION. 
To better understand Bristol-Myers Squibb’s application to class 
actions, it is important to understand two consistently developing bodies 
of law: the growth and restrictions to the class action under Rule 23, and 
the Supreme Court’s narrowing view of both general and specific 
jurisdiction. 
A. The Growth and Recession of the American Class Action 
From the modern revision of Rule 23 in 1966 through the late 1980’s, 
the class action has experienced a period of great growth and optimism 
for its ability to adequately handle large aggregated claims, especially 
large claims against a single defendant.15 Following large restrictions in 
the early 2000’s in response to abuse of the tool, the filing of class actions 
has been more closely scrutinized.16 It is against these developments that 
the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion becomes so critical for the class action’s 
future. 
1. The Creation, Rise, and Golden Era of the Class Action
Lawsuit (1820–1990).
The class action, tracing its origins back to English law, found its 
way to the New World and was introduced through a series of treatises 
issued by Justice Story in the early 19th century.17 These treatises, while 
recognizing the general rule that necessary parties to the controversy must 
be present before the court, theorized one important exception: 
Another exception to the general rule, as to parties, is where they are 
exceedingly numerous, and it would be impracticable to join them 
without almost, interminable delays and other conveniences, which 
would obstruct, and probably defeat, the purpose of justice . . . . The 
most usual cases arranging themselves under this head of exceptions are, 
(1.) where the question is one of a common or general interest, and one 
or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole, (2.) where the parties 
form a voluntary association for public or private purposes, and those, 
who sue or defend, may fairly be presumed to represent the rights and 
interests of the whole, where the parties are very numerous, and though 
15. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 736 (2013).
16. See, e.g., id. 
17. See STEVEN YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 218–221 (1987). 
6
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they have, or may have, separate and distinct interest; yet it is 
impracticable to bring them all before the Court.18 
Following these treatises, the first rule for interest-based 
representation, Federal Equity Rule 48, brought a rudimentary form of the 
class action into practice.19 Subsequent caselaw demonstrated a strong 
desire to apply an equitable rule to allow a party to represent others with 
aligned interests when normally these absent parties would be deemed 
“necessary parties” and required to be involved in the suit.20 Federal 
Equity Rule 48 (which later became Equity Rule 38) was eventually 
adopted into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through Rule 23 in 
1938.21 As American society industrialized, and its economy grew larger, 
our changing ways of life prompted a need for a procedural tool that would 
allow small claims to be efficiently joined together into a consolidated 
action.22 
The original draft of Rule 23 in 1938 brought with it a period of great 
optimism for representative classes.23 A new generation of lawyers and 
scholars envisioned the class action as a procedural method to supplement 
government regulatory efforts and aid in compliance.24 Legal scholars 
18. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS THEREOF,
ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY, OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 78–81 (2d 
ed. 1840). 
19. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (16 How. 1853) (describing Federal Rules of
Equity 48 as: “For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits 
a portion of the parities in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the 
same as if all were before the court.”). See also YEAZELL, supra note 17, at 238.  
20. See Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 302–03 (16 How. 1853) (allowing both plaintiffs and
defendants to represent different regional branches of the Methodist Episcopal Church over objection 
for “want of proper parties to maintain the suit”); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers’ & 
Die Makers’ Unions Nos. 1 and 3, 90 F. 608, 617–19 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898) (allowing labor union 
leaders to represent union members in action for injunction); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 
255 U.S. 356, 363–67 (1921) (noting the availability of class suits, and held that members of fraternal 
organization could properly represent unnamed members in suit for dispersal of funds); United Mine 
Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385–89 (1922) (recognizing that class tool could be 
used to sustain judgement against miners and groups of labor organizations even though they were 
unincorporated).  
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
22. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941) (“Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such group 
injuries for which individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do 
not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is left to assert his 
rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there 
is any at all. This result is not only unfortunate in the particular case, but it will operate seriously to 
impair the deterrent effect of the sanctions which underlie much contemporary law. The problem of 
fashioning an effective and inclusive group remedy is thus a major one.”). 
23. See id. 
24. Id. at 717; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
7
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heralded the class action, noting that “the class suit [is] a way of redressing 
group wrongs [and] is a semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer 
in private practice.”25 Rule 23 soon began to cement itself as a necessary 
tool to allow private parties to organize and pursue legal violations 
alongside public agencies.26 
However, practical problems with the rule still needed to be 
addressed. The main issue became the original rule’s three rigid categories 
of possible class actions—which were based on “the abstract nature of the 
interests involved”—and how to apply a final judgement to the class.27 
These categories—”true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious,”—were early 
attempts to categorize the potential types of class actions.28 The “true” 
category was reserved for classes where a common right was shared 
amongst all parties and the individual with the primary right refuses to 
enforce that right. This allows a class member to represent all others 
situated, such as shareholders of a company suing corporate officers when 
the company refuses to do so.29 The “hybrid” class dealt with multiple 
parties sharing individual rights, but was a form of case consolidation for 
when those rights concerned a shared piece of property: a good example 
being multiple creditors’ claims against a corporation in receivership.30 
Finally, the “spurious” class represented parties who had individual rights, 
but a common question of law or fact was shared among the class and 
common relief was sought.31 For example, multiple landowners 
sustaining property damage by the single conduct of a railroad defendant 
could be consolidated into a spurious class. As with the other categories, 
judgment for the spurious class would only bind those who were “original 
parties, who intervened, and who were in privity.”32 
Practical problems in utilizing the tool’s three categories eventually 
ensued. Specifically, there was difficulty in determining exactly when a 
class fit into one of the rigid categories, and once judgement was rendered, 
25. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 717.
26. Id. at 721 (concluding that our system should utilize class litigation to enforce
administrative and regulatory laws, and act as a private sector supplement to these regulatory 
agencies). 
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
28. Id. 
29. James W. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised By The
Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 572–73 (1937). See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. 
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 233 
(1985). See, e.g., Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (16 How. 1853); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
30. Moore, supra note 29, at 574. See also MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 234.
31. Moore, supra note 29, at 574–75. See also MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 234. 
32. Moore, supra note 29, at 575. See also MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 234.
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how exactly to administer a judgment to the potential class members.33 
This confusion prompted commentators to question whether use of the 
class tool was practical and worth the effort of attempting to determine 
under what category a class fell.34 Scholars and practitioners were 
frustrated that while the “spurious” class seemed to allow flexibility, it 
still only reserved judgement to parties who successfully intervened in the 
action—somewhat defeating the purpose of the tool.35 
These practical problems in application of the rule led to the major 
overhaul of Rule 23 in 1966.36 In effect, the 1966 revision of Rule 23 
became a proper and practical way to maintain a lawsuit representing a 
class of individuals. The new Rule 23 required that judgment apply to all 
individuals the court determined to be in the class, despite whether that 
judgement was favorable or not.37 Further, the 1966 revision removed the 
original types of classes and allowed cases to certify as class actions so 
long as they met the 23(a) certification requirements and fell into one of 
three classes outlined in 23(b).38 
To meet the 23(a) requirements, a potential class must meet a set of 
due process safeguards to be certified as a class. First, the class must be 
so numerous that joinder under Rule 20 would be impracticable.39 Second, 
the class as a whole must share common questions of law or fact.40 Third, 
the claims or defenses of the party representing the class must be typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class members as a whole.41 Finally, it 
must be shown that the representative parties will “fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.”42 These certification requirements act as 
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
34. In his 1950 lecture to University of Michigan Law School, Professor Zechariah Chafee Jr. 
famously demonstrated criticism of the original Rule 23’s categories, noting: “the situation is so 
tangled and bewildering that I sometimes wonder whether the world would be any the worse off if 
the class-suit device had been left buried in the learned obscurity . . . .” ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., 
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY: FIVE LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN APRIL 
18, 19, 20, 21, AND 22, 1949 at 200 (1950).  
35. Compare J.W. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ⁋ 23.10 p. 3444 (2d ed. 1963) (arguing that the 
spurious class was still a more efficient means of easy joinder, even if judgement was not binding on 
all members involved), with FLEMING JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 500 (1963) (theorizing that having 
binding judgment under the spurious class tool would be capable of handling widespread injury 
caused from a single event and even race-relations problems by minimizing litigation).  
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. See also MARCUS 
& SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 234.  
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
38. Id.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(1). 
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(2). 
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(3). 
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(4). 
9
McLeod: Worrisome Application to Class Actions
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
730 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:721 
due process safeguards in using the class tool. It ensures that there are so 
many parties involved that other joinder rules cannot be readily used.43 
Because questions of law, facts, claims, or defenses are shared by the class 
as a whole, an individual party will not be deprived of his rights if his 
controversy is represented through the class.44 Additionally, because a 
representative can adequately represent the class members’ interests, class 
members are assured that their interests are adequately heard, even though 
they are not present.45 These requirements ensure that under proper 
circumstances, a party may represent a larger absent class without 
offending due process.46 
The new rule also prescribed three types of potential class actions. 
First, the (b)(1) class was available for situations where the potential class 
members all had similarly held interests in the litigation, such as 
individual beneficiaries suing a trust organization.47 Second, the (b)(2) 
class allowed injunctive or declaratory relief for a class as a whole.48 
Finally, the (b)(3) class, acting as a catch-all, allowed any class to be 
certified as long as “questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, 
and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”49 These new certification 
requirements, paired with class categories that were not as mutually 
exclusive as the old rules, allowed for greater utilization of the class action 
in American practice.50 
With this tool in hand, a new generation of litigators used class 
actions to give injured plaintiffs an efficient forum for redress, just as the 
early adopters had envisioned.51 This is especially so with the (b)(3) 
money damages class, which allowed plaintiffs who had small claims to 
43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3).
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
46. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierre, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182 n.27 (3d
Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Rule 23 certification perquisites demonstrate that it would not offend 
due process to commence the action without the class members being present. “The rule thus 
represents a measured response to the issues of how the due process rights of absentee interests can 
be protected and how absentees’ represented status can be reconciled with a litigation system 
premised on traditional bipolar litigation.”). 
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
50. MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 235. 
51. See generally Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 22.
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aggregate and pool resources against a single defendant.52 In this spirit, 
the modern class action tackled some of American society’s biggest woes, 
including widespread racial segregation of public schools,53 a women’s 
access to contraceptive options,54 discrimination in the workplace,55 and 
harm to both humans and the environment.56 While class litigants enjoyed 
a long golden period, the procedural tool would soon enter a new period 
of heightened scrutiny and restriction. 
2. The Receding Power of Class Actions, and Growing
Restrictions (1990 to Present).
Starting in the 1990’s, the class action began losing the wide latitude 
it had enjoyed in earlier decades. Several key pieces of rule revisions, 
legislation, and federal circuit court opinions scrutinized the procedural 
mechanisms and added new hoops to jump through for class actions. 
While many of these changes are beyond the scope of this Note, two 
changes are worth discussing. 
a. Rule 23(f) allowing interlocutory appeal of certification
decisions.
The first major change came through the 1998 revision of Rule 23 to 
add section 23(f).57 Prior to the 1998 amendment, parties could rarely 
appeal a court order granting or denying class certification.58 As a result, 
following class certification, defendants were far more likely to settle the 
claims to avoid costly litigation and a potentially unfavorable 
judgement.59 The 1998 amendment to Rule 23 added 23(f), which gave 
broad discretion to federal appellate courts to grant interlocutory appeals 
52. See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (noting the
revisions creating the (b)(3) money damages class “provide[d] means of vindicating the rights of 
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into 
court at all”). See also Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (stating “The 
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries 
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A 
class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into 
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”) (internal citations omitted).  
53. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
55. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).
56. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2nd Cir. 1987); In re 
Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. La. 2011).  
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1998 amendment.
58. Klonoff, supra note 15, at 739. 
59. Id.
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to contested orders granting or denying class certification.60 With a new 
tool to immediately appeal orders granting or denying certification, parties 
were far more likely to appeal certification issues and receive guidance 
from appellate courts. 
This rule change had the inadvertent effect of adding heightened 
scrutiny to the filing and certification of class actions. Rule 23(f) opened 
the door for the federal appellate courts to weigh in on Rule 23’s 
procedural requirements. This has led to hundreds of opinions clarifying 
the Rule 23 requirements for class actions.61 Numerous opinions have 
added heightened scrutiny regarding the threshold requirements of class 
certification, and this new caselaw has made it increasingly difficult to 
successfully certify class actions.62 As Robert Klonoff outlines in his 
work, The Decline of Class Actions, now that federal appellate courts have 
gained greater exposure to decide certification issues, “they have adopted 
troublesome new standards applicable to plaintiffs seeking class wide 
relief.”63 These developments include new standards and caselaw 
applying to threshold evidentiary burdens, class definitions, numerosity 
requirements, commonality requirements, adequacy of representation, 
and predominance requirements.64 As Klonoff further details: “the Rule 
23(a) and (b) criteria, by their terms, have not changed in any significant 
way since 1966, but some courts have become increasingly skeptical in 
reviewing whether a particular case satisfies those requirements.”65 
District courts continue to struggle with these heightened scrutiny levels, 
and certain jurisdictions have become more favorable for the certifying of 
class actions.66 
b. The 2005 Class Action Fairness Act opened federal courts
to hear more class actions.
Congress’s enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) 
drastically altered the potential forums available for class litigation and 
opened up the federal forum to preside over most substantial class actions. 
CAFA reworked the standards for diversity jurisdiction for class actions 
and ensured that parties could either file or remove class actions to federal 
court so long as there was minimal diversity between the parties, and the 
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
61. Klonoff, supra note 15, at 745–46. 
62. Id. at 745–815.
63. Id. at 745. 
64. Id. at 746, 745–815. 
65. Id. at 746–47.
66. Id. at 828. 
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amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.67 This change was inspired 
both by accounts of abuse of the class action from state court judges 
permitting easy certification of nationwide classes in state forums and the 
particular difficulty of removing class actions to the federal courts based 
upon diversity jurisdiction.68 This resulted in a change of viable forums to 
file as “the vast majority of significant class actions were heard in federal 
court.”69 
B. The Supreme Court’s evolving interpretation of personal 
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 
While Bristol-Myers Squibb is first and foremost about California’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction, the decision has created implications for 
class actions. It is therefore useful to understand the Supreme Court’s 
continuing interpretation of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process 
Clause to understand Bristol-Myers Squibb’s development. 
In the 74 years since the delivery of its seminal decision in 
International Shoe, the Supreme Court has limited the application of both 
general and specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction was the first to be 
majorly restrained through the Court’s opinion in Goodyear and 
Bauman.70 There, the Court added additional scrutiny to the requirements 
of general jurisdiction by requiring that a defendant’s continuous and 
systematic contact with the forum render it “essentially at home.”71 This 
was a drastic step, and it widely limited the available forums available 
under general jurisdiction.72 As most commentators believed that specific 
jurisdiction would pick up the slack, it too faced restrictions by the Court. 
The Court’s first restriction to specific jurisdiction came with requiring 
that the defendant must have purposefully availed himself to the 
jurisdiction.73 As caselaw developed, the Court began to limit what factors 
it looked to in determining specific jurisdiction, and the fairness factors 
inherent in International Shoe began to take a back seat to a strict analysis 
of the defendant’s contact with the forum and the “relatedness” of the 
67. See 28 U.S.C. 1332 (d)(2)(A)–(C) (2018); 28 U.S.C. 1453 (2018); 28 U.S.C. 1711–1715 
(2018).  
68. Klonoff, supra note 15, at 743–45. 
69. Id. at 745.
70. Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 
68 SMU L. REV. 107, 107–08 (2015). See also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
71. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929; Bauman, 571 U.S. at 139. 
72. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium
in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 214 (2015).  
73. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
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claims to that contact.74 This restriction of specific jurisdiction culminated 
in Bristol-Myers Squibb, where the majority Court failed to take fairness 
factors into consideration and instead relied upon a strict analysis of the 
relatedness of the claims to the defendants’ contact in California.75 
Any discussion of personal jurisdiction logically starts with 
International Shoe. Here, in its seminal decision, the Supreme Court 
determined that to subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum, “he 
[must] have certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”76 From these contacts we derive either general jurisdiction, 
when the contacts are so substantial and continuous that defendant may 
be sued for any claim,77 and specific jurisdiction, where the claims must 
arise out of and relate to the defendant’s specific contact with the forum.78 
Both doctrines have evolved over the decades as the Court has continued 
to modify and interpret its holding in International Shoe. 
1. The Restriction of General Jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction was originally quite broad. As stated in 
International Shoe, general jurisdiction was based around the notion that 
a defendant’s contact with a jurisdiction was so systematic and continuous 
that claims unrelated to that contact could be brought in that forum.79 It 
followed that as long as a defendant had continuous and systematic 
contact with the forum, say a large corporation who operates regionally, 
they could be sued for any claim in those forums. However, early Supreme 
Court opinions began to limit this broad exercise of jurisdiction. 
Specifically, the Court in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining 
Company held that when exercising jurisdiction over claims unrelated to 
the defendant’s contact in the forum, the central inquiry is whether the 
defendant’s contact was “sufficiently substantial and of such a nature” to 
comport with due process.80 In Perkins, the Court used this inquiry to 
determine whether a Philippine mining company whose operations were 
halted by the Japanese occupation during the Second World War had 
substantial and continuous connection to Ohio when the interim president 
74. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284–89 (2014). 
75. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
76. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
77. Id. at 317. 
78. Id. at 320.
79. Id. at 318.
80. Perkins v. Benguet Cons. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952). 
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operated the company from offices in Ohio.81 Because the operations of 
the company had been fully relocated to Ohio, this justified the exercise 
of general jurisdiction by the Ohio courts.82 
This holding was echoed by the Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall. The Court returned to Perkins to characterize the 
type of substantial and continuous contacts with the forum required to 
subject a defendant to general jurisdiction. While a foreign corporation 
had purchases “occurring at regular intervals” in Texas and had sent 
personnel for training in the state, this was insufficient to create general 
jurisdiction over them.83 Thus, both the Perkins and Helicopteros Court 
recognized that even under the broad language of International Shoe, 
general jurisdiction had its outer limits. 
This ebb became final in 2014 when the Court drastically restricted 
what forums were available for an assertion of general jurisdiction. This 
came through the Court’s dual opinions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman. In Goodyear, the 
Court declined to find that North Carolina could exercise general 
jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary of the Goodyear Corporation simply 
because they had continually conducted business in North Carolina.84 
Relying upon its decisions in Perkins and Helicopteros, the Court 
concluded that “unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime 
business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at 
home in North Carolina.”85 Further, the court reiterated that the foreign 
subsidiary’s “attenuated connections to the State” resembled those in 
Helicopteros, and fell short of “the continuous and systematic general 
business contacts” necessary to create general jurisdiction.86 
The Court echoed this restriction in Bauman. There, the Court held 
that California could not exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler AG, a 
publicly traded German corporation, because of the forum contact of its 
subsidiary (Mercedes-Benz USA) in California.87 The Court reiterated 
that under International Shoe, the main inquiry is whether “instances in 
which the continuous corporate operations within a state are so substantial 
and of such a nature as to justify suit on cause of action arising from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”88 Returning to Goodyear, 
81. Id. at 447–48. 
82. Id. at 448.
83. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984). 
84. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011). 
85. Id. at 929 (emphasis added).
86. Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416). 
87. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014). 
88. Id. at 138 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). 
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the critical inquiry for general jurisdiction is what “affiliations with the 
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] 
essentially at home in the forum State.”89 These limited available 
jurisdictions were proffered by the Court in Bauman as an “individual’s 
domicile” or, for a corporation, “the place of incorporation and principle 
place of business.”90 
In the wake of Goodyear and Bauman, general jurisdiction had been 
drastically reduced.91 General jurisdiction had once been based on simple 
systematic and continuous contact, and in that form, many nationwide 
corporations could be subject to suit in all 50 states.92 General jurisdiction 
was now characterized by where the defendant was “essentially at home” 
and generally limited available forums to the state of domicile for 
individuals or state of incorporation/principle place of business for 
corporations.93 However, this limitation to general jurisdiction was 
originally envisioned to be supplemented with an expansion of specific 
jurisdiction.94 This expansion of specific jurisdiction never came: the 
doctrine of specific jurisdiction similarly became restricted from its 
original view under International Shoe. 
2. The Restriction of Specific Jurisdiction.
International Shoe originally held that specific jurisdiction could be 
exercised over a defendant so long as the defendant had some contact with 
the forum and the claim “arise[s] out of or are connected with the activities 
within the state.”95 In the same breath, the Court noted that this inquiry 
was not to be “simply mechanical or quantitative,” but “whether due 
process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the 
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which 
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”96 It was originally 
thought that specific jurisdiction, while relating to the contact the 
defendant had with the jurisdiction, could still be found depending upon 
the nature of the case and the types of contact defendant had with the 
89. Id. at 139 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919) (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 137.
91. Genetin, supra note 70, at 108. 
92. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 72, at 6. 
93. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Bauman, 571 U.S. at 139. 
94. Genetin, supra note 70, at 114 (citing Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1141–45, 1177–79 (1966)).  
95. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
96. Id.
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jurisdiction. Early commentators to International Shoe noted that the 
court should take into consideration other factors, including: 
(1) the character of the defendant’s activity that led to the controversy, 
which included the nature of the claim at issue; (2) whether the 
defendant was “a corporation [ ] whose economic activities and legal 
involvements were pervasively multistate” or “a natural . . . person 
whose economic activities and legal involvements were essentially 
local;” (3) whether the “defendant’s activity foreseeably involved the 
risk of harm to individuals in communities other than his own”; (4) 
whether the plaintiff was a nonresident, or whether “[the plaintiff’s] . . . 
affairs . . . were spread out over several jurisdictions including the 
defendant’s home;” and (5) “litigational and enforcement” issues such 
as the convenience of witnesses and ease of determining controlling 
law.97 
Following International Shoe, specific jurisdiction slowly became 
restricted. In Hanson v. Denkla, the Court added the requirement that to 
satisfy minimum contacts, the defendant must have “purposefully availed 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its law.”98 As explained in World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, this requirement of purposeful availment 
was added for two major concerns. First, purposeful availment acts as a 
safeguard to interstate federalism concerns by “divest[ing] the State of its 
power to render a valid judgment,” even if that forum would be reasonable 
to handle the claim.99 Second, a purposeful availment requirement gives 
“clear notice” that a defendant would be subject to suit in that particular 
state in relation to his contact there.100 It should be noted that this 
requirement was not originally outlined in International Shoe and acts as 
a restriction on the doctrine of specific jurisdiction.101 
The Court then began to scrutinize the “relatedness” of the claims in 
question but provided no clear analysis as to what constituted claims 
related to the defendant’s contact.102 Helicopteros originally noted that 
the parties conceded to the fact that the claims did not “arise out of” and 
were not “related to” the defendant’s forum activities.103 The Court noted 
97. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 94, at 1164, 1166–69.
98. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 
99. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (citing Hanson, 
357 U.S. at 254). See also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–54.  
100.  World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.  
101.  See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310. 
102.  Genetin, supra note 70, at 115–16. 
103.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984). 
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the confusion and lack of clear standard to the relatedness requirement, 
yet declined to address the issue in that case.104 
The final major restriction to personal jurisdiction came through the 
Court’s opinion in Walden v. Fiore. There, the Court noted that the critical 
inquiry in determining specific jurisdiction was “the relationship between 
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”105 The Court did look to the 
quality and nature of defendant’s contact with the forum as instructed by 
International Shoe, but they did so through the lens of the defendant’s 
actions that connected him to the forum.106 Thus, the Court diminished 
the fairness factors analysis and instead focused on interstate federalism 
and a strict contact analysis to drive personal jurisdiction.107 
This limitation of general jurisdiction and subsequent limitation to 
specific jurisdiction has large and far reaching implications. As noted, 
general jurisdiction was once broad enough to allow nationwide 
corporations who operate in multiple states to be subject to general 
jurisdiction simply because of their continuous and systematic contact 
with the forum.108 Goodyear and Bauman limited available general 
jurisdiction forums to only the select few forums where there are such 
continuous and systematic contacts to render the defendant “essentially at 
home.”109 As noted, commentators expected a limitation of general 
jurisdiction would be followed by a broadening of specific jurisdiction to 
correct for this limitation.110 Instead, specific jurisdiction has found itself 
restricted as well; whether it be from the requirements that the defendant 
purposefully availed himself to the forum, or scrutinizing only the 
defendant’s connection to the forum and focusing on interstate federalism 
as the primary driver behind the personal jurisdiction analysis.111 
In their piece, Toward a New Equilibrium for Personal Jurisdiction, 
Charles “Rocky” Rhodes and Cassandra Burke Robertson note why this 
limitation of general and specific jurisdiction is so important.112 Both 
104.  Id.  
 105.  Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Mag. Inc., 465 U.S. 
770, 775 (1984)). 
106.  Id. at 288–89. See also Genetin, supra note 70, at 152.  
107.  Genetin, supra note 70, at 152.  
108.  Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 72, at 6.  
109.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014). 
110.  Genetin, supra note 70, at 152.  
 111.  See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 440 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  
112.  See generally Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 72.  
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authors in 2014 pointed to the precise problem that is the central issue to 
this Note.113 They state: 
Plaintiffs who want to litigate outside of the defendant’s home states 
will look for a jurisdictional hook, and they will be highly incentivized 
to do so: nationwide class actions, for example, often depend on the 
existence of general jurisdiction, since the cases typically involve 
multiple defendants with different home states. Now, plaintiffs will be 
searching for new jurisdictional grounds . . . . As a result, plaintiffs will 
work harder to establish another ground for personal jurisdiction, 
forcing courts to clarify and resolve some of the remaining questions 
about the scope of personal jurisdiction.114 
The elimination of broad general jurisdiction, restriction of specific 
jurisdiction, and the growth and subsequent restriction of class actions 
form the background of the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion. It was against 
these restrictions that the Court had to decide an issue exactly on point to 
the hypothetical proposed by Rhodes and Robertson.115 Will the 
nationwide money damages class fail, not because class action procedure 
is inappropriate, but because the claims of the absent class members are 
not related to the defendant’s substantial contacts with the forum? While 
this question was not addressed in Bristol-Myers Squibb, certainly it must 
have been contemplated by the Justices. 
III. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB’S WORRISOME APPLICATION TO CLASS
ACTIONS. 
A. The Court’s analysis in Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Bristol-Myers Squibb centered around personal jurisdiction, but the 
opinion issued by the Court has had implications for class actions and has 
led to a standard that the federal district courts have struggled to apply. 
Bristol Myers Squibb, a large American pharmaceutical company 
incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters in New York, produced 
the drug Plavix.116 The company did not produce or manufacture Plavix 
in the state of California, but it received more than one percent of its total 
nationwide sales revenue from drug sales in California.117 In 2012, a 
group of 678 plaintiffs filed eight separate amended complaints in the San 
113.  Id. at 20–21. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1777–78 (2017). 
117.  Id.  
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Francisco Superior Court alleging that Plavix had damaged their health.118 
The group of plaintiffs brought 13 claims under California law, including 
products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and misleading 
advertising.119 Importantly, these plaintiffs consisted of a large inter-state 
group—86 California residents and over 592 other plaintiffs from 33 other 
states.120 The plaintiffs’ contacts with California are critical to the issues 
in this case; while the resident plaintiffs purchased and were injured by 
Plavix in California, the non-resident plaintiffs did not allege that they 
bought or were injured by the drug in California.121 
Bristol Myers Squibb immediately moved to quash service of 
summons on the non-resident’s claims by asserting the California courts 
lacked personal jurisdiction regarding the non-resident’s claims.122 This 
issue would be the main contention of the litigation and would be the 
subject of multiple appeals and eventual review by the Supreme Court. 
Originally, the California Superior Court denied Bristol Myers 
Squibb’s motion, claiming that the California courts could exercise 
general jurisdiction over the company.123 The California Court of 
Appeals, while disagreeing with the Superior Court’s finding of general 
jurisdiction, believed that the California courts had specific jurisdiction 
over the non-resident’s claims.124 The appellate court believed that while 
general jurisdiction was lacking, specific jurisdiction was met because 
Bristol Myers Squibb had such continuous contact with California and all 
the plaintiffs were harmed in the course of identical nationwide 
conduct.125 Under this “sliding scale” approach, the court found that 
Bristol Myers Squibb had established minimum contacts by deriving a 
substantial amount of economic benefits from the State and an extensive 
physical presence.126 Further, the court found a “substantial” relationship 
between Bristol Myers Squibb’s contact with California and the non-
resident claims because, while the non-resident plaintiffs were not harmed 
in California, their injuries resulted from a nationwide course of action by 
 118.  Id. at 1778 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 783, 790–91 
(2017)). 
119.  Id.  
120.  Id.  
121.  Id. 
122.  Id.  
123.  Id. (finding California Superior Courts could exercise general jurisdiction “[b]ecause [it] 
engages in extensive activities in California.”).  
124.  Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2014)). 
125.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 175 Cal.Rptr.3d at 434–35. 
126.  Id. at 433.  
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the drug company that was identical to all the plaintiffs.127 Bristol Myers 
Squibb again appealed this determination. 
The Supreme Court of California eventually weighed in on the issue. 
The majority court agreed with the appellate court, stating that under a 
“sliding scale approach” to contacts with the forum, the state had personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident claims.128 Under this approach, the more 
contact the defendant had with the forum (even if it was unrelated to the 
claim at hand), the “more readily is shown the connection between the 
forum contacts and the claim.”129 Using this sliding scale approach, the 
majority believed that because the company had extensive contacts with 
California, this had moved Bristol Myers Squibb “up the scale,” and 
afforded plaintiffs an exercise of specific jurisdiction “based on a less 
direct connection between Bristol Myers Squibb’s forum activities and 
plaintiffs’ claims that might otherwise be required.”130 The court therefore 
believed that since the claims of the non-resident plaintiffs were based on 
the same nationwide conduct, and the California plaintiff’s jurisdiction 
was uncontested, specific jurisdiction had been met.131 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether this exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper.132 The 8–1 
majority decision, authored by Justice Alito, disagreed with the California 
Supreme Court’s holding that California could exercise specific 
jurisdiction over Bristol Myers Squibb regarding the non-resident 
claims.133 The Court believed that California’s application of a “sliding-
scale approach” to relax the traditional standards of specific jurisdiction 
was incorrect, as an analysis of specific jurisdiction requires a nexus 
between the claims at hand, and the underlying contacts defendant had 
with the jurisdiction.134 The defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff or 
third party alone will not be a basis for specific jurisdiction.135 In their 
analysis, the Court noted that above all other factors, precedent requires 
that for specific jurisdiction to be found, there must be an underlying 
connection between the forum and the claims.136 Thus, the Court did not 
127.  Id. at 434.  
128.  Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 786, 806 (2017)).  
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. at 1779 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 1 Cal.5th 783 at 803–06). 
131.  Id.  
132.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (order granting writ 
of certiorari).  
133.  Id. at 1783.  
 134.  Id. at 1781 (emphasis added). See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 
U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
135.  See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014). 
136.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
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believe that the non-resident plaintiff’s claims related to Bristol Myers 
Squibb’s contact in California: their alleged injury occurred entirely 
elsewhere, and the fact that the claims are materially identical to the 
resident plaintiffs does not create jurisdiction.137 
Having determined that the non-residents could not rely upon the 
claims of the resident plaintiffs, the Court determined that the connection 
between the non-resident claims and California were almost non-
existent.138 These plaintiffs were not California residents, claimed no 
harm within the State, and all the relevant activity leading up to their 
claims happened elsewhere.139 Returning to Goodyear, the Court noted 
that “a corporation’s continuous activity of some sorts within a state . . . 
is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to 
suits unrelated to that activity.”140 Bristol Myers Squibb’s continuous 
economic activity within California was insufficient to create jurisdiction 
for claims that are not directly related to that contact. Therefore, 
determining California had specific jurisdiction over their claims would 
be incompatible with due process.141 
Justice Sotomayor, authoring the lone dissenting opinion in the case, 
expressed deep concerns with the majority’s conclusions. She believed 
that while the majority Court focused on defendant’s contacts with the 
forum as the central inquiry, they failed to address reasonableness as a 
separate core concern. In applying specific jurisdiction, three separate 
inquiries are required: whether the defendant purposefully availed himself 
to the forum,142 whether the plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to the 
defendant’s contact with the forum,143 and whether “the exercise of 
jurisdiction [is] reasonable under the circumstances.”144 Under these 
parameters, Justice Sotomayor believed that the California courts had 
properly exercised specific jurisdiction. 
First, Bristol Myers Squibb’s adequately availed itself to California 
as a forum by engaging in the state economy, contracting with distributors 
in the state, and deriving a substantial amount of its revenues from the 
137.  Id.  
138.  Id. at 1782. See also Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. 
139.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1782.  
140.  Id. at 1781 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 931) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).  
141.  Id. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). 
 142.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1785–86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011)). 
143.  Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). 
144.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. Cal., 480 U.S. 
102, 113–14 (1987)) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985)).  
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state.145 Second, the non-resident claims related to Bristol Myer Squibb’s 
California conduct because all the claims dealt with a nationwide course 
of identical advertising and distribution of drugs across all 50 states.146 
Just because the non-resident plaintiffs were injured in another state, their 
claims still relate to “the same essential acts” of Bristol Myers Squibb that 
also injured plaintiffs in California.147 Accordingly, precedent requires 
“no connection more direct than that.”148 While the majority Court relied 
upon Walden to demonstrate that the non-resident claims did not relate to 
Bristol Myers Squibb’s California contact, this was incorrect as Walden 
dealt with “purposeful availment” rather than the requirement that “a 
plaintiff’s claim ‘arise out of or relate to’ a defendant’s forum contacts.”149 
Third, California’s exercise of jurisdiction over Bristol Myers 
Squibb was reasonable. Both Bristol Myers Squibb and the plaintiffs in 
the case had a strong interest in litigating together in California.150 Bristol 
Myers Squibb would have to defend only one action compared to 
numerous piecemeal actions, and plaintiffs had an interest in pooling 
resources under shared counsel to “maximize recoveries on claims that 
may be too small to bring on their own.”151 Additionally, California had 
an interest in efficiently handling matters that concerned its residents and 
a non-resident corporation doing business within its borders.152 Taking all 
three factors into consideration, exercising jurisdiction over Bristol Myers 
Squibb in California did not offend due process.153 
Having shown that an exercise of jurisdiction over Bristol Myers 
Squibb would comport with due process, Justice Sotomayor noted that the 
majority seemed to rely upon federalism as a central concern.154 By 
relying upon World-Wide Volkswagen, the majority seemed to suggest 
that “‘Territorial limitations on the power of the respective States’ . . . 
may—and today do—trump . . . concerns about fairness to the 
parties.’”155 The majority Court would suggest that even in situations 
where all the fairness factors weigh toward finding jurisdiction, 
145.  Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
146.  Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
147.  Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
148.  Id.  
149.  Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
150.  Id. at 1786–87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
151.  Id.  
152.  Id.  
153.  Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
154.  Id. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
155.  Id. (citing internally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 
(2017)).  
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federalism concerns bar a finding of jurisdiction.156 Considering Bristol 
Myers Squibb was engaged in a nationwide course of marketing Plavix, 
Justice Sotomayor argued no single state had an interest in the controversy 
and relying upon a strict federalism analysis was unwarranted.157 Noting 
a departure from the usual standard, she stated: “I would measure 
jurisdiction first and foremost by the yardstick set out in International 
Shoe—’fair play and substantial justice.’ The majority’s opinion casts that 
settled principle aside.”158 
Justice Sotomayor concluded by noting a concern for the Court’s 
limitation on consolidated actions against a defendant who engaged in a 
single nationwide course of action.159 She feared that these limitations 
would prevent nationwide consolidated claims by restricting plaintiffs to 
filing either in “far flung” forums where a defendant has general 
jurisdiction or bringing their claims separately in multiple state actions.160 
This concern extended to nationwide class actions, with the Justice noting: 
“[T]he Court today does not confront the question whether its opinion 
here would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff injured in the 
forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of 
who were injured there.”161 
B. The confusion in applying the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to 
class actions, and the growing district court divide. 
The Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion is another important case setting 
the limits on a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. However, the 
language of the opinion has worrisome implications to class actions, as it 
would allow absent class members’ claims to be dismissed as if they were 
normal parties to an action.162 In the three years following the opinion, a 
156.  Id. (citing internally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81).  
157.  Id.  
158.  Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
159.  Id. at 1789.  
160.  Id.  
161.  Id. at 1789 n.4. See also Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002) (stating “nonamed 
class members . . . may be parties for some purposes and not for others”); see also Diane P. Wood, 
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 616–617 (1987). 
 162.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (2017) (stating “As we have explained, 
‘a defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for 
jurisdiction.’ This remains true even when third parties (here the plaintiffs who reside in California) 
can bring claims similar to those brought by the nonresidents.” (internal citations omitted)); Further, 
the Court entertains Respondent’s argument under Schutts which concerned personal jurisdiction 
analysis in class actions. Had the Court not had their eyes set on potentially applying the opinion to 
class actions, they would have dismissed the citation as totally irrelevant because it concerned a class 
action, rather than a mass action. See id. at 1782–83.  
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host of federal district courts have entertained motions to dismiss class 
action claims based upon a personal jurisdiction analysis originating from 
Bristol-Myers Squibb.163 These courts have issued differing decisions 
regarding whether the opinion can be applied to class actions, and to what 
degree. 
Three major categories of district court decisions have emerged. First 
are the courts that believe that Bristol-Myers Squibb has no application to 
absent class members in class actions because of the material differences 
between the mass actions and class litigation. Second are the courts which 
apply a “hybrid” approach, where the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion may 
be applied to named representatives of the class, but not to the potential 
class members. Finally, certain courts have applied the opinion to absent 
class members in class actions, allowing a defendant to limit class size to 
only representatives and class members who were affected within the 
forum. These categories are discussed in further detail below. 
1. Courts which have refused to apply the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion to class actions.
While the Bristol-Myers Squibb analysis requires “an affiliation 
between the forum and the underlying controversy,”164 the first category 
of courts has denied application of this analysis to any parties in class 
actions.165 These courts reason that class actions are procedurally distinct 
from the mass actions at issue in Bristol-Myers Squibb.166 So long as 
plaintiffs have adequately met the class requirements of Rule 23,167 
Bristol-Myers Squibb should not be applied to class actions.168 While 
163.  Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, supra note 8, at 22. 
164.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780. 
165.  See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 
4224723 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2017); Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 
2017 WL 5971622 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017)); Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279, 
2018 WL 6460451 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); Sloan v. General Motors LLC., 287 F. Supp. 3d. 840 
(N.D. Cal. 2018); Ochoa v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 5:17-cv-02019, 2018 WL 4998293 (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 30, 2018); Tickling Keys v. Transamerica Fin. Advisor Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (M.D. Fla. 
2018); Becker v. HBN Media, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2018).  
 166.  See Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at *6 (“The Supreme Court could not have intended to 
severely narrow the forum choices available to class actions plaintiffs when it decided a case 
involving a mass action.”); Ochoa, 2018 WL 4998293, at *9 (“However, BMS was not a class action, 
it was a mass tort action in state court. This factor alone materially distinguishes [the current case 
from Bristol-Myers Squibb] . . . .”). See also Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., 
No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017); In re Chinese-
Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *12–17 (E.D. La. 
Nov. 30, 2017). 
167.  For a detailed discussion of the Rule 23 requirements see supra Part II.A.1.  
168.  Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723 at *5.  
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numerous courts have accepted this theory, I would not advance this 
approach because named representatives are parties for procedural 
purposes, and their personal jurisdiction can be challenged using the 
Bristol-Myers Squibb analysis.169 
Two early district court opinions following the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
opinion, one from the Northern District of California and the other from 
the Eastern District of Louisiana, tended to deny that the opinion had any 
applicability to class actions.170 Just as Justice Sotomayor worried, 
defendants attempted to use the opinion to dismiss class action claims on 
the basis that the courts did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants 
regarding out of state class members’ claims.171 However, these two 
courts did not apply Bristol-Myers Squibb, and a number of courts began 
following suit and barred application of the opinion to class actions.172 
Their refusal was grounded in the elementary differences between 
the mass actions at the center of the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion and 
class actions. First, these courts have routinely noted that the Bristol-
Myers Squibb opinion centered around mass actions and have found this 
fact sufficient to warrant not applying the opinion to class action suits.173 
Second, class actions are materially different than the mass actions at the 
center of Bristol-Myers Squibb. The class certification requirements 
outlined in Rule 23 act as due process safeguards in allowing a named 
party to represent a possible nationwide class of similarly affected 
individuals, whereas these certification requirements are rarely met for 
mass actions, requiring each party to be a named party in the action.174 
 169.  See infra Part III.B.2. There, I discuss application of the opinion to named representatives, 
while shielding unnamed class members from a personal jurisdiction analysis. 
 170. . See Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723, at *3; Chinese-Manufactured Drywall, 2017 
WL 5971622, at *12–17. 
 171.  Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723, at *3 (“Dr. Pepper moves to dismiss the complaint 
on the ground that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, or at least over Dr. Pepper as to the 
non-California class members.”).  
 172.  See Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622 
(E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017); Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279, 2018 WL 6460451 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); Ochoa v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 5:17-cv-02019, 2018 WL 4998293 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 30, 2018); Tickling Keys v. Transamerica Fin. Advisor Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (M.D. 
Fla. 2018); Becker v. HBN Media, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Thompson v. 
Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 2:18-cv-05422, 2018 WL 6790561, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2018); Gasser 
v. Kiss My Face, LLC., No. 17-cv-01675, 2018 WL 4538729 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2018). 
173.  See Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, 
at *2–4 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017). 
174.  Id. at *14.  
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This distinction is critical and warrants not applying the opinion to class 
actions.175 
Further, the federalism concerns present in the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
opinion are not present in federal class litigation. The Bristol-Myers 
Squibb opinion concerned the exercise of a state court’s power over a 
controversy that had no connection to the forum.176 While a federal court 
sitting in diversity would still apply substantive state law to a controversy, 
these courts have left open whether the opinion applies in federal court.177 
Importantly, the In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall court noted that 
because traditional choice of law principles and Rule 23’s subclass tool 
adequately handle conflicts of law without dismissing the action and 
creating multiple suits, these federalism concerns are not present in 
federal class actions.178 
In sum, these courts have held that Bristol-Myers Squibb should not 
be applied to any parties in class actions. As Judge Eldon E. Fallon noted 
in his opinion in In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Products Liability 
Litigation: “Bristol Myers Squibb is not a change in controlling due 
process law, does not apply to federal class actions, and Congress and the 
courts have generally approved of using class actions.”179 Therefore, 
defendants cannot use the opinion to break up and limit potential multi-
state class actions. 
2. Courts which have applied a “hybrid” approach when analyzing
class actions.
The second category of courts have been applying the Bristol-Myers 
Squibb opinion to class actions but limiting the analysis to only named 
representatives of the class.180 Courts employing this hybrid approach 
have done so because named representatives of a class action are named 
parties for procedural purposes, and a personal jurisdiction analysis must 
be conducted on their claims. Thus, these courts have adopted a “hybrid” 
approach to applying the opinion by dismissing named representatives 
 175.  See Tickling Keys, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 1350–51; Ochao, 2018 WL 4998293, at *10; Allen, 
2018 WL 6460451, at *7; Becker, 314 F. Supp. 3d. at 1345. 
176.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
177.  Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at *5–6.  
178.  Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at 
*14 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017). 
179.  Id. at *21.  
 180.  See Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 741 (N.D. Ill. 2018) [hereafter Al Haj I]; Samsung 
Galaxy Smartphone Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 16-cv-06391-BLF, 2018 WL 1576457 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 30, 2018); Reitman v. Champion Petfood USA, Inc., No. CV 18-1736-DOC (JPRx), 2018 
WL 4945645 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2018). 
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under the rationale but shielding application to unnamed class members. 
I propose this is the correct approach to applying the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
opinion to class actions. 
While only a few courts have advanced this approach, an instructive 
case on the hybrid application is Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc.181 This case 
concerned a putative class action in the Northern District of Illinois 
wherein two named representatives, Karmel Al Haj and Timothy 
Woodhams, brought suit against Pfizer Inc. alleging violations of multiple 
states’ consumer protection laws.182 Pfizer Inc. moved to dismiss plaintiff 
Woodhams’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.183 Pfizer argued lack 
of personal jurisdiction related to Woodhams’s claims because 
Woodhams was a citizen and resident of Michigan, and the events leading 
up to his consumer protection claim all occurred in Michigan.184 As such, 
Illinois could not exercise jurisdiction over his claims.185 In determining 
whether specific jurisdiction existed over Pfizer in regards to 
Woodhams’s claims, the court noted that Woodhams had not shown that 
there was “a nexus between [Pfizer’s activities in Illinois] and his 
injury.”186 Woodhams’s alleged injury and his contact with Pfizer all 
occurred in Michigan, rather than Illinois.187 Specifically, Woodhams was 
a Michigan resident, and he purchased the Robitussin involved in the case 
at a market in Michigan.188 While the case was filed in Illinois, Pfizer’s 
contact relating to Woodhams’s claims all occurred in Michigan.189 
The court further rejected any argument that this “nexus” was met 
because Woodhams’s claims and injuries were identical to the other 
named representative in Illinois. This argument was almost identical to 
the one offered by the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers Squibb, and the Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that these facts alone created specific 
jurisdiction.190 “The fact that Al Haj ‘sustained the same injury’ as 
Woodhams ‘does not allow Illinois to assert specific jurisdiction over 
Woodhams’s claims,’ given that Woodhams does not ‘claim to have 
suffered harm in Illinois’ and ‘all the conduct giving rise to his claims 
181.  Al Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 741 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. at 749–50.  
186.  Id. at 751–52. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 
(2017).  
187.  Al Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 747.  
188.  Id. at 746.  
189.  Id.  
190.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82.  
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/8
2019] WORRISOME APPLICATION TO CLASS ACTIONS 749 
occurred’ in Michigan.”191 Finally, the district court believed that 
“nothing in [the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion] suggests that it does not 
apply to named plaintiffs in a class action; rather, the Court reaffirmed a 
generally applicable principle—that due process requires a ‘connection 
between the forum and the specific claims at issue.’”192 
The Al Haj court did not initially deal with the issue of applying 
Bristol-Myers Squibb to absent class members. However, after successful 
use of the opinion to dismiss Woodhams’s claims, Pfizer attempted to 
apply the opinion to absent class members in a subsequent briefing.193 
Pfizer argued that the opinion could be used to dismiss the complaints of 
absent class members whose claims had no connection to Pfizer’s activity 
in Illinois.194 The court disagreed, siding with the courts that have barred 
applying the opinion to non-resident class members.195 Rather, the court 
acknowledged that before Bristol-Myers Squibb, “due process neither 
precluded nationwide or multistate class actions nor required the . . . 
jurisdictional inquiry urged by Pfizer,” and “Bristol-Myers does not alter 
that landscape.”196 Thus, the opinion was merely “a straightforward 
application . . . of settled principles of personal jurisdiction.”197 While the 
opinion could be applied to named representatives, such as Woodhams, 
the court believed that the opinion’s application to the absent class 
members had simply not been addressed by the Supreme Court and it 
could not be applied to the absent class members in the current dispute.198 
Because the Al Haj court applied the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion 
to named representatives of the class, but not to absent class members, 
this court falls squarely in the hybrid approach; this court recognized the 
application of the Bristol-Myers Squibb analysis to named representatives 
as procedural parties,199 yet recognized that the due process safeguards 
built into class actions afford absent class members a different 
treatment.200 This rationale has been echoed by the few courts that have 
191.  Al Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 752 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82).  
 192.  Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781) (emphasis added); see Greene v. 
Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874–75 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to 
named plaintiffs in punitive class action).  
193.  Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d. 815, 818 (N.D. Ill. 2018) [hereafter Al Haj II]. 
194.  Id.  
195.  Id.  
196.  Id. at 818–19.  
197.  Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1783). 
198.  Id. at 819.  
199.  Al Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d. at 752. 
200.  Al Haj II, 338 F. Supp. 3d. at 819–20. 
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applied the analysis to class representatives, yet shielded unnamed class 
members.201 
3. Courts which have applied the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to
all parties in class actions.
The final category of courts has applied the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
opinion to all parties in class actions, including absent class members.202 
These courts advance three main theories for doing so: federalism 
concerns, challenges to Rule 23 under the Rules Enabling Act (REA), and 
forum shopping concerns. 
First, certain courts have taken Bristol-Myers Squibb as a signal from 
the Supreme Court that federalism concerns prompt the end to the 
nationwide class action outside the defendant’s state of general 
jurisdiction.203 Just as the Bristol-Myers Squibb Court was concerned 
about California courts finding jurisdiction and adjudicating claims that 
occurred entirely outside the forum, these courts have been concerned 
about the same problems occurring in nationwide class actions.204 These 
courts view the ruling as a tool to either limit such nationwide class actions 
 201.  See Samsung Galaxy Smartphone Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 16-cv-06391-BLF, 
2018 WL 1576457, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018) (“Plaintiffs identify no authority where a court 
has determined that Bristol-Myers does not apply to a named plaintiff seeking to represent a statewide 
class . . . .”); Reitman v. Champion Petfood USA, Inc., No. CV 18-1736-DOC (JPRx), 2018 WL 
4945645, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2018) (“This Court finds that Bristol-Myers does apply where, as 
here, nonresident class representatives assert state-law claims against nonresident defendants on 
behalf of multistate classes . . . .”).  
 202.  See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018); 
Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2017); In re Dental Supplies Antitrust 
Lit., No. 16 Civ. 696, 2017 WL 4217115 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017); Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services 
v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840 (N.D. Ill. 2018); DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17
C 6125, 2018 WL 461228 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018); McDonnell v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC, No. 
16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 
1948, 2018 WL 2238191 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2018); Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 
CV-17-00165, 2017 WL 4357916 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017).  
 203.  See DeBernardis, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (based on the Supreme Court’s comments about 
federalism . . . the courts will apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to outlaw nationwide class actions in a 
form, such as in this case, where there is no general jurisdiction over Defendants); Chavez, 2018 WL 
2238191, at *10–11. See, e.g., McDonnell, 2017 WL 4864910, at *4 (“Purchasers of Women’s Alive 
[products] who live in Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, or 
Washington have no injury arising from Nature’s Way forum-related activities. Instead, any injury 
they suffered occurred in the state where they purchased the products.”).  
204.  DeBernardis, 2018 WL 461228, at *2.  
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to the states of general jurisdiction or handle the cases in individual state 
class actions where only one applicable law would be applied.205 
The second major argument is a challenge to Rule 23 under the REA. 
Under the REA, any of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not 
“[A]bridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right [of the parties].”206 
Under this argument, if courts were to accept the notion that Bristol-Myers 
Squibb applies only to mass actions rather than class actions, then a 
personal jurisdiction analysis regarding the claims of the parties would 
change depending on whether the parties are named individually or as 
class members. Because parties could avoid personal jurisdiction scrutiny 
by filing a class action under Rule 23, this would mean that Rule 23 
modifies a substantive right of the defendant and violates the REA.207 
Because a defendant’s due process rights should remain the same whether 
the suit is a mass action or class action, these courts have found Bristol-
Myers to be applicable to class actions as a way to comport with the 
REA.208 
Finally, these courts are concerned with forum-shopping in filing 
federal class actions.209 The Bristol-Myers Squibb Court was concerned 
with forum shopping because the case involved a host of non-resident 
plaintiffs attempting to take advantage of California’s law by aggregating 
into a state mass action.210 The courts dealing with class actions believe 
that the same concerns are present within federally filed class actions 
attempting to utilize advantageous forums.211 There is no doubt that the 
same fears of forum abuse that influenced Congress to pass the Class 
Action Fairness Act are still present and pushing judges to begin limiting 
 205.  Chavez, 2018 WL 2238191, at *1 (stating “the Court’s concerns about federalism suggest 
that it seeks to bar nationwide class actions in forums where the defendant is not subject to general 
jurisdiction”) (internal citations omitted).  
206.  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).  
 207. . See, e.g., In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Lit., No. 16 Civ. 696, 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017) (stating “the constitutional requirements of due process does not wax and 
wane when the complaint is individual or on behalf of a class. Personal jurisdiction in class actions 
must comport with due process just the same as any other”); Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 
2018 WL 5311903, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018) (stating that applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to 
dismiss claims of nonresident class members “ensures that Rule 23—a rule of procedure subject to 
the [REA’s] limitations—does not violated the [REA] by extending the personal jurisdiction of the 
federal courts to ‘abridge, enlarge, or modify’ a ‘substantive right’”). 
208.  Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840, 861 (N.D. 
Ill. 2018). 
209.  DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 
2018). 
210.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
211.  DeBernardis, 2018 WL 461228, at *2. 
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the power of class actions by restricting the nationwide class action to 
states of general jurisdiction for the defendant.212 
What is most striking about these opinions is that the early courts 
adopting this approach spend very little time illustrating these concerns, 
sometimes limiting the justification down to a single sentence in the 
opinion.213 However, citing these courts as precedent, similar courts have 
begun to agree and advance the theory that the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
opinion can be applied to class actions.214 
C. Limited Guidance by the Federal Circuit Courts 
This divide within the federal district courts has continued to develop 
as courts have analyzed the issue through one of the three main categories 
detailed above.215 But as litigants are now struggling to re-direct their 
strategy in response this debate, this troublesome question of the opinion’s 
application to class actions becomes even more important.216 As the issue 
works through the district courts, there has been limited resolution given 
by the federal circuit courts. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently had the opportunity 
to wade in on the issue in Beaton v. SpeedyPC when it reviewed a district 
court’s order granting class certification to a putative class action against 
a software developer.217 The defendant raised numerous arguments as to 
why the certification of the class and individual issues was a mistake, and 
also raised the argument that under the Bristol-Myers Squibb ruling, the 
district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it regarding the claims of 
non-resident class members.218 However, the defendant had not raised this 
issue of personal jurisdiction in their briefings to the district court, thereby 
212.  Klonoff, supra note 15, at 743–45.  
 213. . See DeBernardis, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (agreeing with district courts applying Bristol-
Myers Squibb to class actions because of federalism and forum shopping concerns); McDonnell v. 
Nature’s Way Products, LLC, No. 16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017) 
(applying Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to consumer class action representing out of state class 
members without giving justification).  
214.  See Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 1948, 2018 WL 2238191 (N.D. Ill. May 
16, 2018), at *10 (relying upon Practice Mgmt., DeBernardis, and McDonnell to apply Bristol-Myers 
Squibb to class actions); Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at *5–6 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 26, 2018) (relying on arguments from earlier cases in the Northern District of Illinois to 
advance the theory that Bristol-Myers Squibb applies to non-resident class members). 
215.  See, e.g., Murphy & Rowe, supra note 10. 
 216.  See Richard Levick, The Game Changes: Is Bristol-Myers Squibb The End Of An Era?, 
FORBES (July 11, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2017/07/11/the-game-changes-
is-bristol-myers-squibb-the-end-of-an-era/#6bfcfbbb2e83 [https://perma.cc/BQG9-AAM8]. 
217.  Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 2018).  
218.  Id. at 1024. 
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waiving the issue for appeal.219 The Seventh Circuit therefore refused to 
directly consider whether the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion should be 
extended to class actions. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals provided the first direct circuit 
court guidance on Bristol-Myers Squibb’s application to class actions. 
Molock v. Whole Foods Market Inc. involved a class action of Whole 
Foods Market employees who brought suit because of the company’s 
failure to uphold contractual provisions provided under their employee 
“Gainsharing” bonus system.220 Alongside other arguments in the district 
court, Whole Foods challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction on two 
grounds. First, Whole Foods argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over the claims of two named representatives to the action.221 Second, it 
argued the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it regarding the 
non-resident putative class members.222 
In analyzing the claims of the two named representatives, the district 
court found that the Bristol-Myers Squibb ruling limited their jurisdiction 
to hear their claims. The claims of the named representatives looked 
almost identical to the claims at issue in Bristol-Myers Squibb because the 
alleged injury did not occur as a result of Whole Foods’s contact with the 
District of Columbia, and the only connection these two representatives 
had with the forum was that the other plaintiffs were injured by similar 
conduct.223 However, the court did not extend the ruling to the absent class 
members after noting key distinctions between class actions and mass 
actions.224 The D.C. district court agreed with the “few courts that have 
squarely addressed the issue,” and determined that because class members 
are not parties like named parties to a mass action, and because Rule 23 
provides additional due process safeguards, Bristol-Myers Squibb should 
not be applied to dismiss claims of non-resident class members.225 
 219.  Id. at 1025 (“Speedy seems to be asking us to extend Bristol-Myers Squibb to nationwide 
class actions. While briefing the issue now before us—class certification—in the district court, neither 
party raised personal jurisdiction. Thus, we have no need to opine on this question, because it does 
not bear directly on our determination.”). 
220. . Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120–21 (D.C.C. 2018).  
221.  Id. at 124. 
222.  Id.  
223.  Id. at 124–25 (“Accordingly, because Bowens’s and Strickland’s claim, like those of the 
non-resident plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers, arise from conduct outside the forum where they seek to bring 
suit, this court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction as to their claims.”). 
224.  Id. at 126–27.  
 225.  Id. Based off the court’s application to the ruling to the named representatives, but not the 
class members, this court would fall squarely into the “hybrid” category I have discussed above, and 
advocate in this Note. 
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The issue was made final by the court, and Whole Foods appealed 
the decision.226 Briefs by both parties made it clear that determining 
whether unnamed class members are parties for personal jurisdiction and 
procedural purposes is the central inquiry.227 The D.C. Circuit sided with 
the plaintiffs, agreeing that, prior to class certification under Rule 23, 
unnamed class members are not yet parties to the action.228 Using a 
“specific application of the more general principle that personal 
jurisdiction entails a court’s ‘power over the parties before it,’”229 the 
court found that unnamed class members were not parties prior to 
certification.230 Parties are those who brought the lawsuit or had the 
lawsuit brought against or have been joined thorough some intervention 
or joinder rule.231 Prior to certification, class members are simply not 
parties before the court—they only become subject to dismissal after the 
class has been certified.232 Because unnamed class members are 
nonparties prior to class certification, the court concluded that the 
attempted dismissal using the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion is therefore 
untimely.233 This opinion about the status of unnamed class members has 
226.  Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 227.  Compare Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 22–25, Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. v. Molock 
et al., No. 18-7162 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2019) (arguing that unnamed class members are not parties for 
procedural purposes and their claims should not be considered in a personal jurisdiction analysis prior 
to certification), with Reply Brief of Appellant at 3–7, Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. v. Molock et al., 
No. 18-7162 (D.C. Cir. May. 10, 2019) (arguing that the party/non-party distinction has no bearing 
in a personal jurisdiction analysis and that claims of absent class members can be dismissed under 
Bristol-Myers Squibb precedent).  
228.  Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“Because the 
class in this case has yet to be certified, Whole Foods’ motion to dismiss the putative class members 
is premature. Only after the putative class members are added to the action—that is, ‘when the action 
is certified as a class under Rule 23.’”) (citing Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 940 (9th Cir. 
2001)). 
 229.  Molock, 952 F.3d at 298 (citing Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 562 
(2017)).  
230.  Id.  
 231.  See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 (2011) (“In general, a party to litigation is 
one by or against whom a lawsuit is brought or one who becomes a party by intervention, substitution, 
or third-party practice.”). 
232.  See In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The 
granting of class certification under Rule 23 authorizes a district court to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over unnamed class members who otherwise might be immune to the court’s power.”); Gibson v. 
Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] class action, when filed, includes only the 
claims of the named plaintiff or plaintiffs. The claims of unnamed class members are added to the 
action later, when the action is certified as a class under Rule 23.”).  
 233.  Molock, 952 F.3d at 298. Interestingly, the court implies that the opinion could still be used 
to dismiss unnamed parties after certification. Id. (“When the action is certified as a class under Rule 
23—should the district court entertain Whole Foods’s motion to dismiss the nonnamed class 
members.”) (internal citations omitted).  
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provided the first clear authority on the issue. However, the circuits courts 
have still yet to address the other three concerns outlined above. 
IV. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO ABSENT CLASS
MEMBERS IN CLASS ACTIONS. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb was by no 
means an incorrect opinion, and this Note does not advance that notion. It 
was an important clarification to the boundaries of specific jurisdiction 
and a new addition to the Court’s portfolio of cases detailing personal 
jurisdiction. However, applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to limit and break 
up class actions outside a defendant’s forum of general jurisdiction has 
proven problematic. 
Courts applying the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to absent class 
members’ claims have little reason to do so. The three major concerns 
cited by these courts—federalism, a violation of the REA, and the dangers 
of forum shopping—are already adequately handled by Rule 23; using the 
Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion adds nothing new. Shoehorning the opinion 
to apply to class actions is a blunt attempt to dismiss class actions unless 
they are filed in the defendant’s forum of general jurisdiction. As such, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb should not be applied to absent class members in 
class action suits. 
A. Federalism Concerns are Not Present in Federal Class Actions. 
The federalism concerns present in Bristol-Myers Squibb are not 
present in federal class actions, thus negating use of the opinion against 
absent class members. California’s exercise of jurisdiction over claims 
which had no connection to the forum created a classic federalism concern 
because one state was adjudicating claims which happened outside its 
borders.234 Although class actions, by their nature, involve adjudicating 
claims in a single forum, federalism concerns are not present because: (1) 
class actions must apply the respective law to the class members involved, 
and (2) CAFA allows for filing or easy removal of class actions to federal 
court to avoid the sway of state courts. As such, the federalism concerns 
cited by courts applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions are 
insignificant. 
First, federalism concerns are already scrutinized as a component in 
the class certification process. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
234.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).  
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Constitution through Erie,235 Klaxon Co,236 and Shutts237 has created three 
major foundations: federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the 
substantive law of the forum where they sit238; choice of law rules are 
substantive rules of the forum state239; and states cannot apply their 
substantive laws to conduct that occurs outside their borders, even in class 
actions filed in the forum.240 Under the REA, district courts cannot use the 
class device to “negate or make it impossible for one or more of the parties 
to assert otherwise available claims and defenses” under state law.241 
So what do these principles mean together? These principles hold 
that although class actions seek to represent class members from multiple 
forums, courts are restrained from applying one law to the entire class, 
and the appropriate substantive law will be applied to each respective 
class member. Taking these restraints together, there is very little concern 
for a federalism issue being present in a federally filed class action. Recall 
that the mass action plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers Squibb attempted to take 
advantage of the substantive state laws of California even though their 
claims did not result from the defendant’s contact with California.242 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the state court’s exercise 
of jurisdiction over conduct which did not occur there would pose a 
federalism issue, violating principles of due process and personal 
jurisdiction. Because district courts cannot apply one substantive law to 
an entire class in a class action, class action suits are wholeheartedly and 
procedurally different from the situation that arose in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb. 
This safeguard is demonstrated through the rigorous choice of law 
analysis that must be conducted at the class certifications stage. Rule 
23(a)(2) requires that for a class to be certified, there must be questions of 
law or fact common to the class, and 23(b)(3) requires that there must be 
“questions of law or fact common to class members [that] predominate 
over any questions affecting individual members.”243 Because multiple 
laws would have to be applied to each member, this forces district courts 
to conduct a choice of law analysis by identifying which state laws would 
be applied to the class members, identifying the substantial issues of the 
235.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
236.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
237.  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985). 
238. . Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.  
239.  Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496–97.  
240.  Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823.  
241.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018). 
242.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).  
243.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3).  
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case, and conducting a state-by-state survey on how those legal issues 
would be affected by each state’s laws.244 
This choice of law analysis embedded in Rule 23 adds two 
safeguards to protect against federalism concerns. First, because a 
certified class action must apply the respective state laws to each class 
member, there is little worry that the court would be handling a case where 
a single substantive law would be applied to controversies that occurred 
outside the forum. Second, if a choice of law analysis reveals that there is 
too great a difference in state laws, the class will be decertified, thus 
negating any concern over the court handling the case in the first place.245 
To illustrate this point, suppose that a consumer in State A is injured 
by the tortious conduct of a corporate defendant headquartered in State B. 
Consumer files a class action in the appropriate federal court under 
diversity jurisdiction and seeks to certify a nationwide class of all those 
injured by the defendant’s negligence. As shown, a rigorous choice of law 
analysis must be done during the certification stage, and a survey of the 
potential laws to be applied to the respective class members must be 
conducted. The substantive tort law of State A can only be applied to those 
class members who were injured in State A; for all other states, the 
respective state laws will be applied to those controversies. It is at this 
point that “predominance” of the common issue of law or fact is 
determined. In this hypothetical, there is no federalism concern implicated 
by this procedure. Even though the class members’ claims are being 
handled in a central forum, State A is still respecting due process by 
applying the respective laws to each controversy or decertifying the class 
if it does not meet 23(a)(2) or (b)(3) requirements. 
Additionally, Rule 23’s subclass mechanism also adequately handles 
potential federalism problems. Rule 23(c)(5) allows the district courts to 
 244.  Holly Kershell, An Approach to Certification Issues in Multi-State Diversity Class Actions 
in Federal Court After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 40 USF L. REV. 769, 783 (2006).  
 245.  Id. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 228 F.3d 1012, 1015, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (“No class 
action is proper unless all litigants are governed by the same legal rules. Otherwise the class cannot 
satisfy the commonality and superiority requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3) . . . . Because 
these claims must be adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is 
not manageable.”); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Given the 
multiplicity of individualized factual and legal issues, magnified by choice of law considerations, we 
can by no means conclude ‘that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.’”); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A] district court must consider how variation in state law affect 
predominance and superiority . . . . In a multi-state class action, variation in state law may swamp any 
common issues and defeat predominance.”); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 
728 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating “[T]he law on predominance requires the district court to consider 
variations in state law when a class action involves multiple jurisdictions.”). 
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create “subclasses” which are treated like individual classes.246 As the 
Eleventh Circuit held in Klay v. Humana, Inc., it is theoretically possible 
to take a nationwide class and break it into a series of subclasses which 
meet certification requirements.247 Therefore, if a nationwide class faces 
a conflict of substantive state laws, the class could be broken up into a 
series of subclasses that aggregate similar state laws together. Just as the 
requirements of class certification are the plaintiff’s initial burden, the 
plaintiff must also demonstrate to the court that subclasses are 
appropriate. This is shown through a rigorous analysis “establishing 
appropriate subclasses and demonstrating that each subclass meets the 
Rule 23 requirements . . . the plaintiffs must come forward with the exact 
definition of each subclass, its representatives, and the reasons each 
subclass meets the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and (b).”248 
Looking back to our earlier illustration, Consumer’s class action may 
be able to utilize subclasses by showing that the multiple states’ laws 
applicable to the class members could be grouped into similar subclasses. 
Therefore, each class would be given a representative, and the plaintiff 
would have to demonstrate that the subclass standing alone meets Rule 
23’s requirements. So, the nationwide class could be broken up into a 
series of subclasses that group either the common issues of fact (Product 
A, Product B, Product C subclasses) or the common laws shared among 
the class (Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania subclasses). 
While Bristol-Myers Squibb presented an interstate federalism 
problem, this concern has no application to class actions because a class 
action must meet a host of due process safeguards to be certified. A choice 
of law survey will be conducted, and the respective substantive law will 
be applied to each class member, so long as a common issue of fact or law 
is shared among the entire class. The sub-classing tool can further be 
utilized to ensure due process is not offended through maintenance of the 
suit. 
Thus, the federalism concern presented in Bristol-Myers Squibb is 
simply not present in federally filed class actions. There is no concern of 
a state court overreaching its judicial boundaries in a class action; 
Supreme Court precedent and Rule 23 limit courts from applying a single 
substantive law to all members of a class action, and potential class actions 
with large substantive law conflicts will likely not be granted certification 
in the first place. 
246.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). 
247.  Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).  
248.  Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing In re 
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203, 221 (S.D. Ohio 1996)).  
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B. The Rules Enabling Act Will Not Be Violated 
The second major challenge to class actions using the Bristol-Myers 
Squibb holding comes from a challenge to Rule 23 under the Rules 
Enabling Act. While Bristol-Myers Squibb was first and foremost about 
personal jurisdiction, the opinion has been shoehorned into class action 
litigation by arguing that there is a procedural difference between class 
actions and mass actions. As the Practice Management Support court 
noted, because a personal jurisdiction analysis would not be conducted on 
all the absent class members in a class action, this arguably modifies a 
substantive right of the defendant and violates the Rules Enabling Act.249 
It would therefore follow that these courts believe that Rule 23, as a 
complete mechanism, violates the REA. 
This argument fails to recognize the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of challenges to the Rules Enabling Act and Rule 23. Illustrative on this 
point is the Court’s most recent Erie doctrine case: Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Association v. Allstate Insurance Co. In Shady Grove, the 
Supreme Court entertained a challenge to Rule 23 when a series of lower 
courts struggled to apply a New York statute, CPLR § 901, which could 
dismiss class actions even though the Rule 23 requirements had been 
met.250 This conflict eventually wound its way to the Supreme Court, 
where the Court reinforced the validity of Rule 23 under the Rules 
Enabling Act.251 
The Court noted that when analyzing statutory challenges to the 
Federal Rules, the federal power to prescribe the rules of procedure has 
always been reinforced so long as the rule regulates matters “rationally 
capable of classification as procedure.”252 This comes with the restriction 
that the rule being challenged must comport with the Rules Enabling Act, 
i.e. it must not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right [of the 
parties].”253 While there have been multiple challenges to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure under the REA, the Court has adopted a restrictive 
reading of the statute. 
The language of the Rules Enabling Act has been interpreted to hold 
that for a rule to be valid, it must “really regulat[e] procedure—the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and 
for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infarction of 
 249.  Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840, 861 (N.D. 
Ill. 2018). 
250.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010). 
251.  Id. at 409. 
252.  Id. at 406 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)).  
253.  Id. at 407 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018)).  
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them.”254 Using this standard, the Court has consistently rejected every 
statutory challenge to the Federal Rules.255 This is because, technically, 
every federal court rule has some effect on the substantive rights of the 
parties involved. But as the Shady Grove Court noted: “each [rule] 
undeniably regulated on the process for enforcing those rights; none 
altered the rights themselves, the available remedies, or the rules of 
decision by which the court adjudicated either.”256 
With this background, the Shady Grove Court held that Rule 23 did 
not violate the Rules Enabling Act. Broadly speaking, Federal Rules 
which allow multiple claims to be litigated together (Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
18, 20, and 42) are valid because they do not alter “separate entitlements 
to relief nor abridge defendants’ rights . . . .”257 Rather, the rules modify 
“how the claims are processed.”258 Because Rule 23 (which can be viewed 
as a complicated form of joinder) only modifies how a claim involving 
multiple plaintiffs against a single defendant is processed, the Court found 
that Rule 23 did not violate the Rules Enabling Act.259 
Turning to our current analysis, the courts which have applied 
Bristol-Myers Squibb to absent class members in class actions have 
brought forth a similar statutory challenge to Rule 23. As the Practice 
Management Support court argued, Bristol-Myers Squibb laid the 
foundation that the due process stops nonresident plaintiffs—whose 
claims do not relate to the defendant’s in-forum conduct—from joining 
and aggregating claims with an in-forum resident.260 Therefore, if a 
personal jurisdiction analysis must be conducted regarding all plaintiffs in 
a mass action (as in Bristol-Myers Squibb), this should not change if the 
action is instead a class action and the additional plaintiffs are unnamed 
class members. If a personal jurisdiction analysis is not conducted on all 
 254.  Id. (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464; 
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987).  
 255.  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407. The Shady Grove Court noted how numerous challenges to 
Federal Rules have failed under this standard. These include methods for serving process under 
Federal Rule 4, requiring litigants to submit for mental or physical examination under Federal Rule 
35, the imposition of sanctions for filing frivolous appeals under Federal Rule Appellate Procedure 
38, and sanctions for those who sign court papers without a reasonable inquiry into the facts asserted 
under Federal Rule 11. 
256.  Id. at 407–08.  
257.  Id. at 408. 
258.  Id.  
259.  Id.  
260.  Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840, 861 (N.D. 
Ill. 2018) (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)). 
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parties, including absent class members outside the forum, then this would 
violate the Rules Enabling Act.261 
While this argument seems to implicate a serious modification of a 
defendant’s due process rights in a class action, it fails to recognize the 
analysis applied in Shady Grove. Again, when the Federal Rules are 
challenged under the Rules Enabling Act, the Act invalidates a rule which 
“. . . alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate 
[those] rights.’”262 If a rule only regulates the manner and means by which 
litigants rights’ are enforced, then the rule is valid under the Act.263 In 
application, Rule 23 does not modify any due process rights of a potential 
defendant because the action is filed as a class action, rather than a mass 
action. 
First, for a class action to be filed in federal court, the defendant must 
still have personal jurisdiction in the selected forum in relation to the 
named representatives’ claims.264 If the defendant lacks personal 
jurisdiction in relation to the named representatives’ claims, then those 
claims will be dismissed, just as if the action were filed as a mass action.265 
If the class has no named representative in the forum, certification is 
impossible.266 This rule is demonstrated by the courts applying the 
“hybrid” approach and scrutinizing the personal jurisdiction over 
defendant regarding named representatives’ claims.267 
Second, Rule 23 merely modifies the manner in which a defendant’s 
due process rights are enforced. While a personal jurisdiction analysis is 
not performed on all absent class members to the action, a defendant’s due 
process rights are still protected through the certification requirements of 
Rule 23. The requirements of Rule 23(a) act as constitutional safeguards 
for class members because they ensure that due process is not offended by 
taking an individual plaintiff’s claim and instead binding him to a class of 
261.  Id.  
 262.  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (citing Mississippi Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 
446 (1946)).  
263.  Id.  
264.  See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:25 (5th ed.) (“A putative class representative 
seeking to hale a defendant into court to answer to the class must have personal jurisdiction over that 
defendant just like any individual litigant must.”). 
265.  See, e.g., id.  
 266.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(a)(4) (Requiring representatives to represent the class with 
similar claims). 
267.  See Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120–21 (D.D.C. 2018); Al 
Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 741, at 752–753 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 
3d 870, 874–75 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
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those who are similarly situated.268 In turn, these constitutional safeguards 
protect defendants as well. Because all certification requirements have to 
be met to certify a class, a defendant will not be asked to litigate and 
defend a class action if the proposed class does not meet the 23(a) and 
(b)(3) requirements.269 This ensures that only the “worthy” class actions 
will avoid the normal personal jurisdiction analysis. Theoretically, 
because the normal personal jurisdiction analysis is supplemented with 
the class requirements of Rule 23, the certifying and maintenance of a 
class would not infringe upon the “notions of fair play and substantial 
justice” that form a defendant’s due process rights.270 
In sum, the argument that Rule 23 modifies a substantive right of the 
defendant to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction over all the parties does 
not hold water. First, the Supreme Court in Shady Grove has already 
reinforced the validity of Rule 23 under the Rules Enabling Act. Second, 
Rule 23 merely alters the manner in which this right can be enforced; a 
defendant may still dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction regarding the 
named representative(s) and challenge that certification requirements 
have been met. Therefore, a defendant’s due process interests are still 
protected whether the claim is a class action or not. 
C. Forum Shopping in Class Actions are Adequately Handled by other 
Mechanisms 
The final concern is that the Bristol-Myers Squibb analysis must be 
applied to all parties in class actions due to forum shopping concerns. In 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, forum shopping was a major concern of the 
Supreme Court. Bristol-Myers Squibb concerned an aggregated group of 
plaintiffs, some of whom were residents of California, and most of whom 
were non-residents.271 The “mass” action was filed in the State of 
California against the same defendant, and every plaintiff asserted claims 
under California law.272 The Court made this fact the center of its 
argument, noting that “what is missing [in this case]—is a connection 
 268.  See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierre, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182 n.27 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Rule 23 certification perquisites demonstrates that it would not offend 
due process to commence the action without the class members being present. “The rule thus 
represents a measured response to the issues of how the [D]ue [P]rocess rights of absentee interests 
can be protected and how absentees’ represented status can be reconciled with a litigation system 
premised on traditional bipolar litigation.”). 
269.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–23(b).  
 270.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that “notions of fair 
play and substantial justice” form the due process rights of the defendant). 
271.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017). 
272.  Id.  
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between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”273 Thus, while the 
entire group of aggregated plaintiffs could have brought a combined suit 
in the defendant’s forums of general jurisdiction (New York or Delaware), 
such an action could not take advantage of the laws of California, at least 
not for the entire group of plaintiffs.274 
In applying the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to class actions, the 
DeBernardis court noted: “there is also the issue of forum shopping . . . 
possible forum shopping is just as present in multi-state class actions.”275 
However, this forum shopping concern is also noted by courts refusing to 
apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions by demonstrating that the 
forum shopping concerns are not usually present in class actions and 
complex litigation.276 It would seem that courts are split on just how 
prevalent forum shopping is in class litigation. 
Forum shopping in class actions is already adequately handled by 
two mechanisms previously mentioned in this Note. First, class actions 
have built-in mechanisms to handle differences in state laws. Thus, class 
members cannot take advantage of favorable state law if the action were 
filed as a class action. This is because class actions cannot apply one law 
to the entire class, and a rigorous choice of law analysis is done during the 
certification stage to apply these state laws to the individual class 
members.277 Second, the Class Action Fairness Act—created to combat 
class action forum shopping in state courts—makes it far easier to mitigate 
forum shopping by removing class actions to federal courts.278 By 
reworking federal court diversity standards for class actions, the majority 
of significant class actions with minimal diversity of parties and an 
amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000 will gain access to the 
federal courts and avoid advantageous state forums. 
First, as previously discussed in Part IV.1., the built-in mechanisms 
to class actions make it difficult for potential class members to take 
advantage of forum shopping.279 While federal courts sitting in diversity 
must apply the laws of the state where they lie, the Supreme Court has 
273.  Id. at 1781.  
274.  See, e.g., id. at 1783. 
275.  DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 
2018). 
 276.  In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 
5971622, at *16. (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017). 
277.  See supra Part IV.1.  
 278.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2)(A)–(C) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1711–
1715 (2018); see also supra notes 58–59.  
279.  See supra Part IV.1. (discussing why federalism concerns are not present in federal class 
actions because class actions have been designed so that one state cannot apply a single substantive 
law to every class member in the controversy). 
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held that in the context of a nationwide class action, a state cannot impose 
its substantive laws onto claims which did not occur within its borders.280 
This holding facilitates a rigorous choice of law analysis to be conducted 
at some point in the class certification stage of the action, and class 
members would be sorted into respective groups based on the state law to 
be applied to them.281 Under this view, forum shopping is likely a non-
existent danger to class actions; because an application of respective state 
law is done for each group of class members, it is impossible for a class 
member to take advantage of the laws of another forum—his state’s law 
will be applied to his controversy. 
With respect to forum shopping for advantageous class certification 
standards, the Class Action Fairness Act made forum shopping 
significantly harder. As previously mentioned, CAFA expanded the 
federal court jurisdiction over class actions by making it easier to file or 
remove class actions to federal courts.282 As evident by Congressional 
records, CAFA was passed as a way to combat forum shopping for 
advantageous state courts and filing nationwide class actions in those 
courts.283 With passage of CAFA, the majority of significant class actions 
can now be filed or removed to federal court to avoid the sway of 
advantageous state courthouses.284 It should be noted that CAFA was 
passed due to concerns with forum shopping in state courts, so the ability 
to seek out federal forums has drastically cut down on litigants hunting 
for advantageous forums to file. 
Finally, some amount of forum shopping for courts with 
advantageous certification standards is inevitable in class actions. With 
the federal courts having been granted greater jurisdiction to hear class 
actions, and appellate review under Rule 23(f), a series of advantageous 
circuits to file have emerged based on differences in interpreting the rule’s 
certification requirements.285 Take for example, the differing 
requirements for numerosity under Rule 23. Rule 23 requires that for a 
class action to be filed, the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all 
 280.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985). 
281.  See supra Part IV.1.  
 282.  See supra Part II.B. (describing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 as a major milestone 
in curbing forums selection in state courts).  
283.  See S. REP. No. 109-14 at 10–21 (2005) (the Senate report noted concerns for lawyers 
“playing” the system by maneuvering around diversity requirements and filing class actions in 
advantageous state courts. This facilitated an act by Congress to rework federal court diversity 
requirements to allow for easier removal by defendants in class actions.).  
284.  Klonoff, supra note 13, at 745. 
285.  Id. at 828. 
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members is impracticable.”286 However, as Robert Klonoff notes in The 
Decline of Class Actions, what was once the “least demanding 
requirement of Rule 23 (a)” now has heightened scrutiny given by certain 
circuit courts.287 Courts have diverged on how much evidence is needed 
to demonstrate numerosity: can the certifying court simply rely on 
common sense and assumptions based off the class complaint, or does it 
need hard evidence that the number of people involved in the class meets 
numerosity standards?288 While topics like these are collateral to this 
Note—and worthy of their own separate discussions—it suffices to 
understand that these splits have emerged for almost every prerequisite of 
Rule 23.289 As such, it is inevitable that, based off the underlying facts and 
legal issues at hand, certain class actions will seek out more advantageous 
forums to file. 
However, these differences can be corrected as caselaw on class 
certification continues to develop in the federal circuits. As Klonoff 
further states, “On some issues, courts can alter their approach as a matter 
of caselaw. On other issues—those on which the Supreme Court has 
rendered a decision or where there is an unresolved conflict among the 
circuits—a rule change may be required.”290 Thus, these splits will only 
begin to be corrected as class action caselaw continues to develop in the 
circuit courts. This solution will take time and continued study; something 
which would be severely cut short through application of Bristol-Myers 
Squibb to immediately bar most nationwide class action. 
V. CONCLUSION 
New challenges have reshaped the practice of class actions, and the 
list of new challenges far exceeds what could be analyzed in one Note. 
However, applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions is a small, yet 
worrisome trend that should be addressed. Should the opinion be applied 
to absent class members in class actions, it would bring a whole new 
challenge that was not previously required; a personal jurisdiction 
286.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
287.  Klonoff, supra note 15, at 773.  
288.  Id. at 768–73 (Klonoff conducts a thorough analysis of the federal district and circuit courts 
to conclude there is a split based off of how much concrete evidence courts require to determine that 
the class is so numerous that traditional joinder would not be practicable). 
 289.  See, e.g., Klonoff supra note 15, at 761–68 (detailing heightened requirements for class 
definition); id. at 768–73 (detailing heightened requirements for numerosity); id. at 773–80 (detailing 
heightened requirements for commonality); Id. at 780–88 (detailing heightened requirements for 
representation); id. at 792–99 (detailing heightened requirements for predominance based off of the 
type of claims involved).  
290.  Id. at 829. 
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challenge which would arguably go against the very purpose of the class 
tool in the first place. As litigants eagerly await circuit authority on the 
issue, the application of Bristol-Myers Squibb must be addressed to 
preserve the widespread utility gained from class actions under Rule 23. 
A first-year law student can open their rulebook and tell you that Rule 23 
requires no personal jurisdiction analysis of class members—and it should 
remain this way. The class action should be preserved as it was imagined; 
a way for the harmed masses to efficiently organize against the wrong 
doer, for the many to stand against the few, and to ensure that justice is 
efficient and fair. Otherwise the “parade of horribles” originally dismissed 
by the Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb may soon come to 
fruition.291 
291.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1783 (2017). 
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